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Abstract
Recent collapses of high profile business failures like Enron, Worldcom, Parmlat, and  Tyco has been
a subject of great debate among regulators, investors, government and academics in the recent past.
Enron’s case was the greatest failure in the history of American capitalism and had a major impact
on financial markets by causing significant losses to investors. Enron was a company ranked by
Fortune as the most innovative company in the United States; it exemplified the transition from the
production to the knowledge economy. Many lessons can we learn from its collapse. In this paper we
present an analysis of the factors that contributed to Enron’s rise and failure, underlying the role that
energy deregulation and manipulation of financial statements played on Enron’s demise. We summarize
some lessons that can be learned in order to prevent another Enron and restore confidence in the
financial markets, as well as in the accounting and auditing professions.
Keywords:  Enron, Corporate Ethics, Corporate Bankruptcy, Creative Accounting.
Introduction
T
he rise and fall of  high profile businesses like Enron, WorldCom, Parmlat and
        Tyco has been a subject of great debate and research among regulators, investors,
government and academics in the recent years. Enron, for one, was the greatest failure
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in the history of American mercantile capitalism and had a major impact on financial
markets by causing significant losses to banks, insurance companies and pension
funds that invested directly in Enron, as well as on other  small and large investors.
Moreover, the breakdown of this corporation  made imperative to assess what has to
be done to ensure the soundness of financial reporting worldwide and to encourage
and support accountants in their efforts to protect the public interest. What went
wrong with Enron? A company that was ranked by Fortune as the most innovative
company in the United States; a company that exemplified the transition from the
production to the knowledge economy. What lessons can we learn from Enron’s
collapse? Ultimately, it is clear that responsibility for the Enron affair cannot be
identified with only its top managers, and certainly it cannot be generalized to the
entire accounting and auditing professions. The company and its management, the
auditors, banks, analysts, regulators, speculators and standard setters are all responsible
in some degree for this historical collapse. Many significant issues have to be analyzed,
including the need for clear and unequivocal accounting and auditing standards of
international application; it must be also acknowledged that conflicts or interest arise
between corporations and investors markets when systematic inefficiencies
characterize financial markets. In this context, this paper  examines the factors that
contributed to Enron’s rise and failure.  An examination of the role that energy
deregulation, manipulation of financial statements and over exploitation of risky
financial assets operations, namely energy derivatives, played on Enron’s demise is
emphasized. We summarize lessons that can be learned in order to prevent another
Enron and restore confidence in the financial markets. The paper is organized in
eight sections. Section I examines Enron’s origins and evolution. Section II analyzes
Enron keys factors intervening for its short lived success. Enron’s success and
increased profits were largely derived from important and continuous innovations;
these are identified and analyzed in Section III. To finance its operations and hedge
against risk,  Enron used limited partnerships called “special purpose entities” (SPEs),
which allowed to increase leverage and return on assets without having to report debt
on its balance sheet. The nature and implications of these partnerships and derived
“creative accounting” are examined in Section IV. Section V discusses the role of
deregulation, particularly electric power deregulation   and its over all impact on
Enron, emphasizing its relationship with its  special purpose entities. Section VI,
gives full account of Enron’s accounting practices; The company took full advantage
of accounting limitations in managing its earnings and balance sheet  to portray a
favorable picture of its performance.
Many lessons can be learned from Enron’s failure, particularly to prevent similarThe Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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corporate disasters in the futures; these lessons are summarized in Section VII;
problems and lessons, and suggestions for their solution include administrative, legal,
regulation, ethical, educational, and accounting and auditing practices issues. Finally,
Section VIII summarizes the issues and findings of this paper.
I.  Enron’s Beginnings and Progression
Enron’s roots can be traced to 1985, when Kenneth Lay helped form a company
operating in one of the oldest, capital-intensive commodity industries in the world -
gas and utilities. Enron was born from the merger of Houston Natural Gas and
InterNorth, a Nebraska pipeline company (Thomas, 2002). With the help of
deregulation, Kenneth Lay was considered a pioneer in taking the energy supply
business from a sleepy monopoly as a regulated utility, to a free-market commodity
that previously did not exist.   In the process of the merger, Enron incurred enormous
debt and, as the result of deregulation, it lost its exclusive rights to the pipelines.  In
order to endure, a newly hired consultant Jeff Skilling, developed an innovative
business plan to generate earnings and cash flow. Through the creation of “gas banks”
Enron would buy gas from a network of suppliers and sell it to a network of consumers,
contractually guaranteeing both the supply and the price, charging fees for the
transactions and assuming the associated risks (Thomas, 2002). In so doing, Enron
created both a new product and a new model for the industry – the energy derivative.
It continued to diversify beyond the pipeline and natural gas trading into becoming a
financial trader and market maker in electric power, coal, steel, paper and pulp, water
and broadband fiber optic cable capacity (Healey and Palepu, 2003). Enron trading
activities were reported to be very innovative; Enron had made money off gas and
electricity futures; thus, the firm believed that they could the same for fiber-optic
bandwidth, pollution-emission credits, even weather derivatives. Indeed, Enron moved
even farther a field with its trading and risk management competency, trading wood
pulp, steel, and television advertising; results were promising, for by year 2000 Enron
was the seventh largest company in America and was paving the way to become the
largest. In its annual reputation survey, Fortune listed Enron as the most innovative
company in the United States (Curral and Epstein, 2003).
Enron’s gas trading idea was probably a reasonable response to the opportunitiesElisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
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arising from deregulation. However extensions of this idea into other markets and
international expansion were unsuccessful.  By 2001, Enron had become a
conglomerate that owned and operated gas pipelines, electricity plants, pulp and paper
plants, broadband assets and water plants internationally and traded extensively in
financial markets for the same products and services.  It started to fall from grace,
however, when investors questioned the value of the company’s stock as a result of
the company’s questionable accounting methods.1
II.   Key to Enron’s Success
During the late 1990s Enron had implemented repeated value innovations, lowering
the cost of gas and electricity to customers by as much as 40 percent to 50 percent.
Enron did so while dramatically reducing its own cost structure and by creating the
first national spot market for gas in which commodity swaps, future contracts, and
other complex derivatives effectively stripped the risk and volatility out of gas prices
(Kim and Mauborgne, 1999).
Enron was involved in every aspect of the energy supply chain, from natural gas
pipelines to power marketing and allowance trading, including coal trading and coal
mine. As a result, Enron made its mark on the industry and forever changed how coal
and energy are traded (Fiscor, 2002). Enron was, in essence, two companies. One
was an energy supply company that purchased pipelines and electrical power plants
that provided energy while the other was a financial institution that functioned as a
major dealer in wholesale and derivatives transactions in energy products and some
financial derivatives. The energy supply side of the company had information from
energy producers about production costs and distribution problems. On the dealer
side of the company, it had critical knowledge of order flow as market participants
came to them to either buy or sell which it could share directly with its energy-supply
operations, thereby providing a major competitive advantage to Enron.
The energy supply business grew rapidly by making major investments in the United
States and abroad. This rapid accumulation of assets, which was mostly financed by
debt, produced a high debt-to-equity ratio that was partially hidden from investors
through partnerships known as “special purpose entities.” The financial institution
1 For a full assessment of current accounting disclosure problems see: Benston et al. (2003).The Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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grew rapidly by profiting from the broader growth in derivatives trading in general,
plus profiting from trading during the energy crisis in California in the summer
of 2000 (Dodd, 2002). Enron made large profits from its trading activities because
it was both a dealer and a key market participant in the underlying commodities.
Accordingly, Enron had acquired market power. As long as Enron bought at a
lower bid price than it sold at its ask price, it earned the spread on trading volume.
It also earned speculative profits by taking a position in the market due to its
advantageous position.
Enron’s model was to acquire physical capacity in each market and then leverage
that investment through the creation of more flexible pricing structures for market
participants, using financial derivatives as a way of managing risks. Enron argued
that the systems and expertise it had acquired in gas trading could be leveraged to
new markets. The trading model assumed continuous growth as it diversified from a
pure energy firm into a broad-based financial service company (Healy and Palepu,
8). Thus,  the successes of Enron was rooted in its ability to manage risks in complex
transactions.Yet these very risks that ultimately brought Enron down  (Chatterjee,
2003). Moreover, success and failure derived from Enron’s corporate culture of
innovation and competitiveness, where employees enjoyed autonomy if they produced
quarterly results. That culture fed its appetite for new ideas and for creative,
hardworking people. But the drive and independence also helped enable financial
deception, because the company encouraged experimentation but discouraged anything
other than success (Fox, 2003).
III.  Enron’s Innovations
Enron facilitated its increased profits as well as a name in the U.S. corporate culture
by introducing a number of innovations.   In 1988 the company made a major strategic
shift by pursuing unregulated markets in addition to its regulated pipeline business
(Fox, 2003).
In 1989 it launched Gas Bank, which allowed gas producers and wholesale buyers to
purchase firm gas supplies and hedge the price risk at the same time. In that same
year, its Transwestern pipeline is the first merchant pipeline in the U.S. to stop selling
gas and become a transportation-only pipeline.
Enron used derivatives to reduce risks associated with future gas prices. In so doing,Elisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
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Enron took advantage of the derivatives revolution that had already begun in the
finance area, but it was new to the natural gas industry.  Over the years, trading
derivatives would become one of Enron’s special talents.  Most of Enron’s trading
involved customized contracts used outside of exchanges, which meant that there
was no exchange regulating these deals (Fox, 2003).
In 1999, Enron began using an accounting method known as “mark-to-market”
for booking the value of its trades. Enron believed this type of accounting more
fairly presented the results of managing in its portfolio of trades and contracts
(Chatterjee, 2003).
Enron also pioneered the Special Purpose Entities. An SPE is simply a trust created
by a company to hold some of the company’s assets; typically, the SPE would then
either borrow against those assets or conduct more complex financing arrangements
backed by those assets. Because the SPE, contains some assets but none of the
company’s existing debt, it’s a less risky borrower and can therefore borrow money
at lower rates. In general an SPE is a legitimated way of segregating a special risk,
from a company’s core operations and help it pay less to borrow money.
Enron used a SPE organized by Citigroup to disguise significant amounts of debt as
commodity prepaid transactions. Through a series of circular or round-trip prepaid
connections, the Special purpose entity was the centerpiece in allowing Enron to
borrow money but to record the amount borrowed as cash generated by operations,
because prepaid commodity contracts are generally booked as trades, not loans
(Sapsford and Bekett, 2002).
Closely related to the SPE was the VPP, Volumetric production payment, the loaning
of money to oil and as production companies, asking to be repaid in oil and gas.
Enron wasn’t  in a financial position to just hand out millions of dollars to oil and gas
producers and then wait a couple of years for the gas sales.  So the company set about
to create financing vehicles to raise the money for the VPPs. These instruments,
which were perfectly legal, laid the groundwork for the more complicated entities
Enron created in the late 1990s that eventually led the company’s demise (Curral and
Epstein, 2003).
Another closely related instrument was the Cactus Funds, a pool of VPP contracts in
limited partnerships.  This group produced a stream of gas supplies that could be sold
at spot prices. It then used natural-gas swaps to stabilize the prices Cactus could getThe Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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for the gas, lowering the risk.  This meant, that a Cactus Fund produced a known
series of cash payments almost like a bond. Enron could then split up the Cactus
payments as securities and sell them to banks the way an investment firm might sell
a corporate bond to big investors.  Selling a sort of massaged pool of VPP contracts
raise the cash Enron needed to make the VPP loans. Enron didn’t hide its use of the
Cactus Funds, instead pointing to them as creative solutions to the problem of raising
funds inexpensively. By mid 1993, Enron had used Cactus partnerships to raise some
$900 million (Fox, 2003).
In addition to Cactus, Enron had a partnership known as Joint Energy Development
Investors or JEDI, purposely named after the characters in the Star Wars movies.  It was
a 50-50 partnership between Enron and the pubic pension system of California, known
as CalPERS, or the California Public Employees’ Retirement System.  JEDI was believed
to be the first partnership of its kind, in that a pension fund initiated and helped structure
it. It also became the first company to issue a new kind of debt known as “credit sensitive
notes.” These notes paid interest rates that varied based on Enron’s credit rating.
Enron also was very keen in being a world company and venture into the international
arena and some of its efforts came to a successful reality when in 1993 its Teesside power
plant in England begins operation.  Also in 1993 Enron and Maharashtra reach agreement
to build the massive Dabhol power plant in India. The $2 billion Indian project presented
a lot of challenges to the company from its very beginning.  It opened up in 1999.  In 1998
it agrees to buy Wesses Water, a British water utility, for $2.2 billion.  Wessex becomes
the core of Enron’s new water unit, Azurix.  In 1999 Azurix goes public with a $700
million initial public offering. Also, Enron created the first LJM partnership in order to
hedge its investment in an internet company.
In 1994 Enron completed  its first electricity trade, and in 1997 it traded its first
weather derivative.  It goes on to trade coal, pulp, paper, plastics, metals and bandwidth.
In that same year it formed the first independent partnership run by an Enron
employee occurs when it forms Chewco Investments managed by Enron employee
Michael Kopper.
In 1999, it also launched Enron Online, its Internet based system for wholesale
commodity trading. Also, Enron forms the LJM2 partnership. Also in 1999 Enron
conducts its first bandwidth trade.
Another innovation in 2000 was the initiation of EnronCredit.com, which boughtElisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
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and sold credit risk to help companies manage the risk incurred in trading transactions.
Also in that year Enron created the first Raptor special purpose entity.  The Raptors
would be used to hedge Enron investments. But mostly backed y Enron stock, they
were  risky vehicles (Fox,2003).
Enron’s accounting firm, Arthur Anderson, which like other big accounting firms,
also did Consulting work for Enron, signed off on the company’s questionable
accounting practices. According to a number of people, the accounting rules were
vague enough and the company’s deals complex enough that it was often difficult to
tell when Enron violated rules. But Anderson downplayed questions about the
accounting practices; indeed, employees concerned about those practices were simply
fired (Curral and Epstein, 2003).
Arthur Anderson’s Enron account delivered an average weekly billings of $1 million,
over half being for nonaudit services.  Anderson also housed a number of its staff in
Enron facilities, and  was a routine supplier of accounting staff to Enron and counted
numerous members of the Enron management team among its alumni (Demski, 2003).
Andersen weakened the authority of this Central authority in its own firm and allow
the Enron partner in charge to have final say on a number of reporting issues.
IV.  Use of Special Purpose Entities
Enron used “special purpose entities” (SPEs) to access capital or hedge risk.  These
limited partnerships permitted Enron to increase leverage and return on assets without
having to report debt on its balance sheet. Under the leadership of Andrew Fastow (A
Skilling’s protégé who had gone up in ranks becoming Enron’s CFO in 1998) the
company took SPEs to new heights, thereby pushing accounting principles to the
breaking point. It capitalized on them not only with a range of hard assets and liabilities,
but also with extremely complex derivative financial instruments (Thomas, 2002).
Enron had used hundreds of special purposed entities by 2001.  Many of these were
used to fund the purchase of forward contracts with gas producers to supply gas to
utilities under long term fixed contracts (Tufano,1994). However, several controversial
special purpose entities were designed primarily to achieve financial reporting
objectives. As an example Chewco and several other special purpose entities, did
more than just skirt accounting rules. As Enron revealed in October 2001, they violated
accounting standards that require at least 3 percent of assets to be owned byThe Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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independent equity investors. By ignoring this requirement, Enron was able to avoid
consolidating these special purpose entities.  As a result its balance sheet understated
its liabilities and overstated  its equity and earnings (Healey and Palepu, 2003).
Enron’s derivatives contracts allowed executives to conceal the risks from investors
and even from the company’s Board. Their very complexity obscured the fundamental
weakness of these financing instruments and, by placing unchallenged power in the
hands of a few, threatened basic concepts of risk management.  Moreover, this type
of scheme, so prevalent in the 1990s “bull market” and so compelling in Enron’s
collapse, divert companies from applying new technologies and work practices to
their infrastructure and business processes (Apgar, 2002).
The Cactus transactions were a legal and innovative way to transfer the risks and the
debt associated with the VPP contracts off Enron’s corporate balance sheet. Certainly,
the Cactus Fund moved some profits of Enron’s books, too-but it was willing to
record just a portion of the profits in its financials if that income came without adding
to the company’s debt.
V.  Role of Deregulation
While deregulation generally led to lower prices and increased supply, it also
introduced increased volatility in gas prices. Enron began offering utilities long-
term fixed price contracts for natural gas, typically at prices that assumed long-
term declined in spit prices (Healy and Palepu, 2003). To ensure delivery of these
contracts and to reduce exposure to fluctuation in spot prices, Enron entered into
long-term fixed price arrangements with producers and used financial derivatives,
including swaps, forward and future contracts.  It also began using off-balance
sheet financing vehicles, known as Special Purpose Entities to finance many of
these transactions. Enron was a child of deregulation.  Although Enron’s field would
later expand to include Electricity and electric deregulation, in the early years
deregulation was about natural gas.
Another dimension of the Enron case is the role that deregulation of electric power
played in its rise and demise. Much of the U.S. economy can be efficiently run as a
free market —but not electricity (Kuttner, 2002). In no industry has deregulation
raised as much fear and concern as in electric power markets (Geisst, 2000; Rossi,
2002). Enron’s collapse can be used as a prime example to demonstrate thatElisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
Alejandra Cabello, Benjamín Moncarz
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deregulation of electricity went too far.  As California’s power disaster proved demand
for electricity is relatively inelastic. Traditionally, regulated power coexisted with
adequate supply and fair prices because the system included both capacity for peak
demands and prohibitions on price-manipulation and windfall profits. But deregulation
signals entrepreneurs both to discard spare capacity and to accumulate the sort of
market power that brings price manipulation. Moreover, the system needs spare
capacity, in case prices peak or brownouts occur. In a deregulated system, utilities
and consumers are prey for traders.  Even a well-designed market system creates
opportunities for market manipulation (Kuttner, 2002). In this climate, it was
guaranteed that Enron would generate earnings by manipulating supply in California
and the highly publicized shortage of electric power of the summer of 2000.
Neoclassical economists argue that removing economic regulation would promote
efficiency, induce innovation, lower costs, lower prices, and improve reliability
(Trebing, 2002). But  deregulation has many pitfalls. Instead of a promised 30
percent reduction in price together with improved reliability, California consumers
saw wholesale markets soar and reliability virtually collapse (Trebing, 2002). In
theory, it created an efficient market. In practice, it created a system so complex
that energy traders like Enron Corp. could manipulate supply and price, evade
scrutiny, and fleece consumers (Kuttner, 2002). Over time, Enron was all over the
country, at every hub. More than just a broker, it became a “market maker” for gas:
a trading firm that stood ready to make deals in order to keep the flow of trades
going (Fox, 25). According to economist Paul Joskow, “It was an accident waiting
to happen from day one” (Rossi, 2002).
VI.  Manipulation of Enron’s Financial Statements
Enron’s business model, as previously analyzed, reached across many products,
including physical assets and Trading operations and crossing national borders-
stretched the limits of accounting.  The company took fool advantage of accounting
limitations in managing its earnings and balance sheet  to portray a rosy picture
of its performance.
Enron highlights the many flaws prevalent in the  industry.  Many of Enron’s
accounting actions were legal. Off-balance sheet accounting is legal, however, the
ability to design transactions that satisfied the letter of the law, but violated the intent
such that its balance sheet did not reflect its financial risks (Healey and Palepu,The Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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2003). Thus, one potentially positive outcome of Enron’s scandal should be improving
the process by which auditors are selected, retained and compensated. This should
be accomplished promoting corporate governance structures that allow shareholders
a direct path for deciding on auditor choice and compensation (Abdel-khalik, 2002).
Market-to-market accounting needs to be clarified so that it isn’t abused in illiquid
markets, which is what Enron did.  And the definition of what makes an SPE
independent needs to be refined. Enron’s external auditor Arthur Anderson, accepted
Enron’s decision not to consolidate the derivative-related liabilities of these entities
with the corporation’s overall liabilities. These entities hid the fact that Enron was
massively at risk (Millman, 2002). As its financial dealings became more complicated,
the company also used SPEs to hide troubled assets that were falling in value, such as
certain overseas energy facilities, the broadband operation or stock in companies that
had been spun off to the public (Thomas, 2002).
As the value of the assets in these partnerships fell, Enron began to incur huge debt.
From 1999 through July 2001, these entities paid Fastow more than $30 million in
management fees, far more than his Enron salary. This was also with the approval of
top management and Enron’s board of directors.
Although some analysts saw the decline of Enron as unavoidable with the
climbing coal prices, the world economy headed into a recession, thus
dampening energy market volatility and reducing the opportunity for the large
trading gains that had made Enron so profitable, its collapse was the result of
deceptive methods used to disclose its complicated financial dealings. Enron
failed because its management was caught defrauding the market with false
reporting and manipulating accounting rules.  Enron’s financial management
lack of transparency in reporting its financial dealings, followed by financial
restatements disclosing billions of dollars of omitted liabilities and losses,
contributed to its demise. Enron’s obsession with meeting analysts’ profits
estimates was so great that Enron’s executives went too and strained not only
to deliver outside profits but also reliable ones from the types of activities that
investors favored  (Chaffin, 2002).
On October 16, 2001 Enron announced its first quarterly loss in more than four years
after taking charges of $1 billion on poorly performing businesses as the energy
supply business suffered heavy losses on such ventures as an electrical power plant
in India and a water treatment plant in the United Kingdom. Enron also lost moneyElisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
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trying to create markets in bandwidth access, and steel.  Enron sold shares to offset the
company’s private equity losses, severely diluting earnings. It also disclosed the reversal
of the $1.2 billion entry to assets and equities it had made as a result of dealings with
these arrangements. It was this disclosure that got the SEC’s attention (Thomas, 2002).
In response to the aforementioned events and the downgrading of Enron’s credit
ratings, traders lost trust in Enron. Without the trading volume, Enron was without
liquidity and without the volume that turned bid-ask spreads into large earnings. In
the end, the deceptive hiding of debt and losses and the fabrication of income proved
to be a deadly combination (Dodd, 2002). Poor financial stewardship not only took
Enron to the edge it also brought the lethal blow. Although Enron had at its base a
very valuable set of assets and cash flow streams, its value was ultimately offset by
the huge liability and capital cost incurred when investors could not trust the company’s
financial management (Livingston, 2002; Cato Institute, 2002).
According to Healy and Palepu (2003) two kinds of issues proved difficult. First,
Enron’s  trading business involved complex long-term contracts. Pursuant to current
accounting rules the present value framework was used  to record these transactions,
requiring management to make forecasts of future earnings. Hence, Enron’s
management made forecasts of energy prices and interest rates well into the future.2
Second, Enron relied extensively on structured finance transactions that involved
setting up special purpose entities. These transactions shared ownership of specific
cash flows and risk with outside investors and lenders. Traditional accounting, which
focuses on arms-length transactions between independent entities, faced challenges
in dealing with such transactions. Although accounting rule makers have been debating
appropriate accounting rules for these transactions for several years, mechanical
conventions were used to record these transactions, creating a divergence between
economic realities and accounting numbers.3
Enron declared bankruptcy just weeks after it was revealed that it had manipulated its
2 To a great extent, Enron's price predictions relied on its ability of manipulate supply and prices, as previously
pointed out, diminishing the prediction capability of the models used by either masking some information or else
leaving aside some powerful models. On this issue see Mathew et al. (2005).
3 Notwithstanding errors and guilt from certain Enron managers, it is important to recognize that frauds related to
accounting are part of a complex social construction which includes issues of regulation, governance, economic
crises, poverty, race, youth, politics, and class; it is a social phenomena, which during the last few years has
manifested itself in several leading corporations around the world. In this respect, it is important  to assess the
importance of assessing the power of institutions-including accounting-in creating reality and reconstructing the
frailties and errors of humans. Important studies on accounting and corruption can be seen in:Lehman and
Okcabol (2005), and Rezaee (2005).The Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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financial statements. Lost were $60 million of shareholder investment, forty-five
hundred jobs, and the savings upon thousands of workers and retirees. Protecting
pension savings plans is not the only reform the Enron debacle puts under
consideration. Accounting industry critics note that where accountants once clearly
served the public interest by checking the books, auditing has become a marketing tool
to sell “consulting services” such as computer systems, advice on tax shelters, and business
strategy evaluation.
Arthur Andersen had many professional staff members working full time at Enron’s;
and opinion letters provided by Andersen were critical in legitimizing the various
Special Purpose Entity transactions (Dmeski,2002). Enron paid Arthur Andersen $25
million in auditing fees and $23 million in consulting fees in 1999. According to
Andersen, a “significant but undetermined” number of documents and electronic
files related to Enron were destroyed.
VII.  Lessons to be Learned from Enron
Enron’s failure was anything but typical. In a decade and a half it was transformed
from a large natural-gas pipeline company to an energy trading firm that bought and
sold gas as well as electricity. Enron evolved beyond energy trading, trafficking in
metals, paper, financial contracts, and other commodities. By the late 1990’s so much
of Enron’s business came from trading. Accordingly, it stopped being an energy
company and functioned as a sort of bank (Fox, 2002).
What can we learn from Enron’s collapse, and how do we prevent another Enron?
How can we avert situations in which corporate greed destroys not only shareholder
value but also companies themselves?
Enron had been endorsed as a knowledge-intensive company that was leading the
New Economy. This is why its bankruptcy shocked and infuriated many regulators,
economists, accountants, and investors who have been taken in by the deliberate
self-promotion of Enron. The failure of Enron undermined confidence in financial
markets in the United States and abroad. It caused substantial damage throughout the
financial system resulting from multi-hundred-million-dollar write-offs from exposure
to Enron. This situation clearly underscores a very important weakness in the behavior
of corporations and financial markets ––the exploitation of conflicts of interest. Enron’s
leadership failed to protect investor interests by recording misleading transactions inElisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
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30
which the economic risk stayed with the company, but liabilities and losses were
transferred to off-balance-sheet entities. Most important, it promoted a culture based
on oversized corporate egos that went beyond its original core business and fostered
aggressive accounting practices (Walter, 2004). Although potential conflicts of interest
are a fact of life among financial firms, they are only viable when competition is not
perfect and when markets are not fully transparent. Since market imperfections are
systematic even in highly developed financial systems, causing agency problems, it
is essential that this problem be solved through improved transparency and market
discipline to strengthen public confidence in financial markets (Walter, 2004).  In
addition to a lesson in corporate responsibility there are major concerns that need to
be addressed in the Enron demise including the role of electric power deregulation,
audit committees and financial analysts. Moreover, Enron was a financial institution
but it was subject to no federal regulation as a financial institution. It had no capital
requirements, no margin or collateral requirements, no reporting requirements, no
licensing or registration requirements, and there was no obligation as a dealer to
make a market by maintaining bid and ask quotes as specialists on stock exchanges
do. Traditional financial institutions must meet all these requirements (Bing, 2002;
McLean and Elkind, 2003). In sum, Enron’s leadership failed to protect investor
interests by recording misleading transactions in which the economic risk stayed
with the company, but liabilities and losses were transferred to off-balance-sheet
entities. Most important, it promoted a culture based on oversized corporate egos
that went beyond its original core business and fostered aggressive accounting
practices. Enron suggests the need for tougher regulation in several areas. First and
foremost there is a need for an improved reporting model that provides investors
with quality information in making investment decisions. This model should address
off-balance-sheet activity, other risks related uncertainties that will provide transparent
reporting. Table 1 summarizes the lessons to be learned from Enron’s rise and collapse
analyzed in the previous sections. Columns 1  identifies the problem areas which
include deregulation, corporate governance, accounting standards, the accounting
and auditing professions, investments analysis, business ethics, and business teaching
and research; in column 2 we identify the lessons to be learned; finally in column 3
we offer some suggestions for reform and preventive changes to avoid  in the future
corporate collapses similar to the one experienced by Enron.
Finally, although there is plenty of blame to go around, one of the most important
lessons from Enron’s collapse concerns both the centrality and fragility of
organizational trust. The profound implications of the loss of trust can be seen in
other corporate collapses as well, such as WorldCom Inc., Tyco International, GlobalThe Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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Crossing, Parmlat,  and Adelphia Communications Corp. Central to this entire
discussion of increased corporate accountability is the issue of trust —its importance,
how to build it, and how to maintain it. Organizational and individual trust is critical
to organizational performance and success. This conveys a critical lesson for all senior
corporate managers regarding the importance of corporate accountability (Currall
and Epstein, 2003).Elisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
Alejandra Cabello, Benjamín Moncarz
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Enron  was not a complete fraud.  The company was an innovator into trading gas
and electricity, exemplified by its push into the financing of energy projects. It expanded
the use of derivatives in the energy industry and introduced new ways of managing
Problem Area Lessons to be Learned Suggested Reform
Deregulation of electric
power industry
Deregulation has many pitfalls. However a
return to full re-regulation of the industry is
unlikely to create more efficient markets in
states like California
New regulation of the electric power industry is necessary
in order to ensure that companies do not engage in trading
activities such as Enron. There is a need, however, to keep
in proper perspective Schumpeterian innovations and issues
associated with efficiency, reduction in prices and
reliability.
Corporate governance Financial Executives failed in their duty to
protect the company's assets and provide full
disclosure to investors
The SEC has already taken steps by issuing new rules
including the implementation of the requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which stipulates that chief executive
and financial officers certify the company’s financial
statements. 
Accounting standards Use of aggressive earnings standards nobody
understands. 
Use of special purpose entities to hide company’s debt and
use of derivatives, among other items, need revised
accounting standards that clearly include written discussion
of all off-balance-sheet transactions in financial reports. 
Accounting and 
Auditing professions
Integrity of audit process can be
compromised in cases where external
auditors engage in consulting work that
generate hefty fees         
An effective and transparent system of self-regulation for
the accounting profession subject to SEC's monitoring.
Creation of a new regulatory framework for the accounting
profession in which there should be a separation of the
auditing and the consulting functions.
Investment Analysts Wall Street analysts who failed to advise
investors of Enron’s developing problems,
yet kept recommending investment in spite of
deceptive reporting.
The “investor alert” issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission is a move in the right direction. Educating the
investor on the role of analysts is needed so that potential
investors do not rely solely on analysts’ predictions.
Business ethics Collapse of a leading company such as Enron
is a case of ethical bankruptcy. 
Emphasis on ethical codes of conduct. Employees at all
levels should be able to report violations to an independent
party without fear of reprisal. Business schools need to
highlight the importance of business ethics. 
Board of 
Directors/Audit 
Committees
Boards of Directors and audit committees
that failed to protect investors interests
Audit committees should add independent financial experts
to their roster who have extensive experience in corporate
financial management.
Business Teaching and
Research
Insufficient business ethics in business,
accounting and accounting courses and
programs; limited research on business ethics.
Revise business, accounting and auditing courses
integrating teaching of business ethics. Promote the
development of new theories, models and advanced
empirical studies on corporate governance, early warning
models of corporate failure, and unethical practices,
corporate regulation and business ethics. 
Table 1
Lessons from  Enron’s Rise and CollapseThe Rise and Collapse of Enron:
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risk, which lowered the costs of  energy-related transactions for a great number of
businesses.  The collapse of Enron provides a vision into how this web of corporate
governance, with multiple players, can go off track. Enron carried out many, many
highly complex and carefully crafted financial transaction. Mostly they involved selling
of additional financial services by consultants, attorneys, and investment banks. In
many cases these transactions were designed with no apparent purpose other than
manipulating recorded debt and earnings and often provided an opportunity for a financial
institution to collect fees on both sides of a transaction (Demski, 2002).
VIII.  By Way of a Summary
In sum, the economic recovery in the United States and abroad weakened in 2002 as
financial markets reflected the uncertain environment of declining stock market prices
resulting from corporate and accounting scandals like Enron, WorldCom and others.
This demonstrates the vulnerability of financial markets and the need to restore
integrity to the reporting system and to address issues associated with corporate
accountability.  As stated by Lev (2003) earnings manipulations are prevalent; but
except for specific cases, it is hard to detect and prosecute them. Trying to regulate
earnings manipulations out of existence with more detailed rules seems unlikely. The
key to sustainable economic growth lies in corporate reforms that strengthen corporate
governance and restore confidence to the financial system (Brancanto and Plath, 2003).
The Enron story, is one of actual achievement, but also of arrogance, ambition and
deceit.  It’s the story of how so many people and agencies missed the cracks in Enron’s
front, in part because the system was set up that way.  In short, it’s the story of how
American capitalism worked at the end of the twentieth century. The Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) and other government agencies have placed the
improvement of financial reporting at the top of its agenda and has issued numerous
new rules and rule proposals including the creation of a new regulatory framework
for the accounting profession and rulemaking to implement the requirements of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Indeed, Additionally, one potentially positive outcome of Enron’s
failures will be clear and  improved process by which auditors are selected, retained
and compensated. Directors, accountants and auditing firms need to be sensitive and
responsive to the new levels of scrutiny and exposure caused by the Enron bankruptcy,
the WorldCom debacle, and other recent corporate scandals. The new emerging
reporting and auditing standards along with firm ethical decision making should be
the basis for leading corporate practices for the XXI Century.Elisa S. Moncarz, Raúl Moncarz,
Alejandra Cabello, Benjamín Moncarz
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